I start my book Self-Knowledge for Humans by talking about the challenge of discussing self-knowledge with people who haven’t studied philosophy as an academic subject. Most non-philosophers believe self-knowledge to be an interesting and worthwhile subject and are disappointed when they learn what
philosophers of self-knowledge actually talk about (“Why on earth would you be interested in that?”). The focus in philosophy has been on narrow and trivial seeming forms of self-knowledge (knowledge of one’s own beliefs and sensations) to the exclusion of what I call ‘substantial’ self-knowledge, knowledge of such
things as one’s own emotions, character, values, abilities, and concealed thoughts and desires. Questions about the extent of self-ignorance and the value of self-knowledge are addressed by some philosophers but there is still the sense that the philosophy of self-knowledge is mainly concerned to discover
technical solutions to technical problems generated by background philosophical assumptions about the nature of knowledge and the nature of mental states.
My question is: are people right to be disappointed in the way that (most) philosophers talk about self-knowledge? Should philosophy be trying to engage with the questions about self-knowledge which interest non-philosophers or is it okay to just focus on a range of philosophical puzzles about self-knowledge (how self-knowledge be immediate? How can privileged access to one’s own mind be
reconciled with content externalism?)?
My own view, for what it’s worth, is that self-knowledge is one area (there are many others) where it is unacceptable for philosophy to remain it its bunker and simply refuse to engage with wider concerns. Apart from being dry and difficult, it seems to me that so much of what passes for the ‘philosophy of
self-knowledge’ these days is also very boring. Self-Knowledge for Humans is, in part, a response to my own increasing sense of frustration about the way the subject has been going. I don’t know if the explanations I give in the book of the way the philosophy of self-knowledge has been going are plausible, but I’m convinced that there is something here which needs explaining.
A parting thought: in giving talks based on the book at universities around the world I’ve noticed an interesting pattern: my frustrations about the subject and the way it has developed seem to have been shared by older but not younger members of the audiences I have addressed. Could there be something in that?
philosophers of self-knowledge actually talk about (“Why on earth would you be interested in that?”). The focus in philosophy has been on narrow and trivial seeming forms of self-knowledge (knowledge of one’s own beliefs and sensations) to the exclusion of what I call ‘substantial’ self-knowledge, knowledge of such
things as one’s own emotions, character, values, abilities, and concealed thoughts and desires. Questions about the extent of self-ignorance and the value of self-knowledge are addressed by some philosophers but there is still the sense that the philosophy of self-knowledge is mainly concerned to discover
technical solutions to technical problems generated by background philosophical assumptions about the nature of knowledge and the nature of mental states.
My question is: are people right to be disappointed in the way that (most) philosophers talk about self-knowledge? Should philosophy be trying to engage with the questions about self-knowledge which interest non-philosophers or is it okay to just focus on a range of philosophical puzzles about self-knowledge (how self-knowledge be immediate? How can privileged access to one’s own mind be
reconciled with content externalism?)?
My own view, for what it’s worth, is that self-knowledge is one area (there are many others) where it is unacceptable for philosophy to remain it its bunker and simply refuse to engage with wider concerns. Apart from being dry and difficult, it seems to me that so much of what passes for the ‘philosophy of
self-knowledge’ these days is also very boring. Self-Knowledge for Humans is, in part, a response to my own increasing sense of frustration about the way the subject has been going. I don’t know if the explanations I give in the book of the way the philosophy of self-knowledge has been going are plausible, but I’m convinced that there is something here which needs explaining.
A parting thought: in giving talks based on the book at universities around the world I’ve noticed an interesting pattern: my frustrations about the subject and the way it has developed seem to have been shared by older but not younger members of the audiences I have addressed. Could there be something in that?
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